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Did war cause the abolition of New Zealand’s provincial system?

Did war cause the abolition of New
Zealand’s provincial system?
André Brett
Some historians identify warfare in the North Island between settlers
and Māori as the key to the abolition of New Zealand’s provinces in 1876.
This requires reconsideration. I suggest that warfare had notable but not
dire consequences for provincialism, and that other issues were of greater
significance. Although the central state gained powers during wartime,
these rarely came at the expense of provincial powers. The botched
implementation of the New Zealand Settlements Act, which has been cited
as evidence of provincial failure, actually reflected poorly on both levels
of government. The centralising impulse must be found elsewhere. Rather
than being caused primarily by wartime expansion of the central state,
major centralising reforms were more due to provincial mismanagement
and reckless borrowing for public works that provoked a public desire for
change. When settlers were presented with an alternative central vision of
development, they embraced it and rejected the provinces.
This article has been peer reviewed.

While New Zealand developed as a unitary state, this was by no means
inevitable. It embarked on representative government in 1853 with a
quasi-federal system of provincial governments that lasted for over two
decades.1 Provincial abolition was approved by the central parliament
in 1875 and became effective on 1 November 1876. New Zealand’s
movement away from any semblance of federalism rather than towards it
is distinctive – it is the only British settler society to dismantle a system of
states or provinces. Many other colonies pursued an opposite trajectory,
such as the unions that created the dominions of Australia, Canada, and
South Africa. The surprising swiftness of the demise of provincialism has
led historians to propose a range of theories to explain abolition, and one
of the most persistent relates to the New Zealand Wars between Pākehā
(white) settlers and Māori in the North Island during the 1860s.
1

The definitive work on the provincial system remains W. P. Morrell, The Provincial
System in New Zealand 1852–76 (Christchurch: Whitcombe and Tombs, 1964 [1932]).
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Historians have argued across multiple generations that war generated
the centralising forces that fatally encroached upon the provinces. B. J.
Dalton put the warfare-as-centralisation argument concisely, stating that
‘the great expansion in the central government’s activities’ was ‘necessary
to match the new responsibilities of native policy and war from 1860
onwards’.2 Similarly, Tony Ballantyne has suggested that the ‘key engine
for political transformation was the conflict over land and sovereignty
that raged from the end of the 1850s through to the early 1870s’, and
that the wars were ‘an important impetus towards the centralisation
of power in New Zealand’ by enlarging the central state and shifting
emphasis away from the provinces.3 This argument was embedded in W.
P. Morrell’s earlier study of the system. When he discussed the botched
implementation of the New Zealand Settlements Act, he depicted it as a
provincial failure, asking: ‘if the northern Provincial Governments could
not colonise [under the Act], was not the strongest argument for their
existence taken away?’4
The warfare-as-centralisation argument needs to be reconsidered.
Warfare had notable but not dire consequences for provincialism;
although it was a factor, other issues were of greater significance.
Bernard Attard has recently argued that New Zealand’s centralisation
was the result of the dynamics of colonial development and rising
indebtedness rather than warfare.5 He does not, however, explore
why wartime policies that would seem to have favoured centralisation
were unsuccessful, and he implies that the demise of provincialism
was inevitable. New Zealand’s demand for British capital, he argues,
meant ‘the dynamic of settler developmentalism inevitably led to the
centralisation of state power itself’. 6 This argument is predicated on
acceptance of P. J. Cain and A. G. Hopkins’ ‘gentlemanly capitalism’ thesis
that London financiers drove imperial expansion and development.7 Yet,
2
3
4
5

6
7

B. J. Dalton, War and Politics in New Zealand 1855–1870 (Sydney: Sydney University
Press, 1967), 12.
Tony Ballantyne, ‘The State, Politics and Power, 1769–1893’, in The New Oxford History
of New Zealand, ed. Giselle Byrnes (South Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2009),
112, 117.
Morrell, Provincial System, 152.
Bernard Attard, ‘From Free-Trade Imperialism to Structural Power: New Zealand and
the Capital Market, 1856–68’, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 35, no. 4
(2007): 505–27; Bernard Attard, ‘Making the Colonial State: Development, Debt, and
Warfare in New Zealand, 1853–76’, Australian Economic History Review 52, no.2 (2012):
101–27.
Attard, ‘Making the Colonial State’, 103.
P. J. Cain and A. G. Hopkins, British Imperialism, 1688–2000 (Harlow: Longman, 2002
[1993]).
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New Zealand settlers demonstrated an assertive independent streak
from the moment London granted the colony its first constitution in
1846 – a flawed document that was unceremoniously rejected. 8 Attard
rigorously analyses the economic position of the provinces, but it
is also necessary to interrogate what New Zealanders expected from
their provincial governments, how they responded to failure, and
what central actions most affected provincialism’s fortunes. Settlers
placed their own needs and preferences in the foreground, not those of
gentlemen capitalists. Abolition was only accomplished when centralists
won the 1875–76 election, a de facto referendum on the existence of
provinces.9 The provinces were neither abolished on instruction from
the Colonial Office, nor because of coercion by financiers. They were
abolished because electors chose abolition in response to the provinces’
demonstrated administrative failures.
Hence, building on the valuable insights of Attard’s work, I not only
seek to fill his analytical gaps but also diverge from some of his con
clusions, and argue that there was nothing inevitable in the demise of
provincialism, since the forces underpinning abolition derived from
the provinces’ own recklessness and mismanagement. This article first
examines the powers acquired by the central government during wartime
and whether they came at the expense of provincial authority. It then
locates the centralising impulse elsewhere, but reveals that warfare –
specifically loans to fund military activity – contributed to the timing
of abolition. My previous research has shown that public works policy,
especially with regard to railway expansion, runs as a common thread
from the dawn of provincialism to its abolition.10 Here I dig deeper to
show the relationship between war, public works, and the financial
burdens both created. Greater agency must be ascribed to New Zealand’s
settlers in the dismantling of provincial institutions. A clearer picture
of why settlers disowned provincialism and what events made abolition
attractive will enable a more thorough assessment of how substantially
war contributed to New Zealand’s centralisation.

8

9
10

The standard study remains A. H. McLintock, Crown Colony Government in New Zealand
(Wellington: R. E. Owen, 1958), but the best analysis is Sonia Cheyne, ‘Search for a
Constitution: People and Politics in New Zealand’s Crown Colony Years’ (PhD thesis,
University of Otago, 1975).
For a detailed study see J. L. Hunt, ‘The Election of 1875–6 and the Abolition of the
Provinces’ (MA thesis, University of Auckland, 1961).
André Brett, ‘Dreaming on a Railway Track: Public Works and the Demise of New
Zealand’s Provinces’, Journal of Transport History, 36, no. 1 (2015): 1–20.
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The limited centralisation of warfare
The provincial system at its creation in 1853 was a response to New
Zealand’s dispersed Pākehā population and comprised six provinces based
upon the main sites of settlement.11 In accordance with the provisions of
the 1852 Constitution Act of the British parliament, each province had a
unicameral council and a separately elected superintendent who possessed
executive power but was neither responsible to, nor represented in, the
provincial legislature. Above the provinces sat the bicameral General
Assembly of the central government, which first met in Auckland in
1854 and received responsibility in 1856 before relocating to Wellington
in 1865. It possessed an elected lower house and an upper house
nominated from the late 1850s on the advice of responsible ministers.
Members at both levels were elected on a male property franchise that
was generous but not universal, effectively excluding Māori as few held
individual titles to land. In 1858, the New Provinces Act of the General
Assembly permitted rapidly growing hinterland regions to secede from
their province and form a new one. The system thereby grew to comprise
10 provinces, although only nine existed at any one time. The key task
of the provinces was to promote wider and deeper colonisation of New
Zealand through immigration and public works. They began as powerful
political entities: they, rather than the central government, maintained
immigration agents, and they surveyed, built, maintained and operated
bridges, harbours, railways and roads. Provincial councils sat before
the General Assembly and enjoyed a wide range of powers, with only 13
subjects of legislation – matters such as common weights and measures,
customs duties and currency – under the central government’s exclusive
jurisdiction.
From the outset, some politicians sought to increase the power of the
provinces – ultra-provincialists led by William Fox even sought a fully
federal system – while others asserted the primacy of central control.
This has led to a simplistic analytical distinction between provincialists
and centralists, but politics at both the national and provincial level
11

This paragraph and the next draw upon the scholarship of D. G. Herron, whose work,
although often overlooked, contains much analysis of a definitive character on
1850s New Zealand politics. See ‘The Structure and Course of New Zealand Politics,
1853–1858’ (PhD thesis, University of Otago, 1959); ‘Provincialism and Centralism,
1853–1858’, in Studies of a Small Democracy: Essays in Honour of Willis Airey, ed. Robert
Chapman and Keith Sinclair (Auckland: Blackwood and Janet Paul, 1963), 10–32; and
‘The Circumstances and Effects of Sir George Grey’s Delay in Summoning the First
New Zealand General Assembly’, Historical Studies: Australia and New Zealand 8, no. 32
(1959): 364–82.
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was defined more by shifting personal cliques, and the fervent localism
was imported from Britain.12 D. G. Herron has refuted the existence of a
binary divide of provincialists versus centralists during the 1850s: the
extent to which politicians emphasised one or the other position was often
dependent upon the offices they held and how (un)successful they were
in forming government in the General Assembly.13 Provincial councils
tended to stress the needs of provincial capitals and their ports, fostering
discontent in rapidly expanding hinterlands that contributed much to
provincial revenue but received few services in return. This discontent
found expression in secessionist movements. Centralists, perceiving
that the creation of small and weak new provinces would undermine the
provincial system, joined with secessionists to secure the passage of the
New Provinces Act, the first significant blow against provincialism.14
Was the second blow the outbreak of the New Zealand Wars in
February 1860? I do not dispute Damon Salesa’s assertion that war
‘forged the new self-governing colonial polity, [and] critically shaped
settler subjectivities and institutions’ especially as a ‘workshop for …
projects of racial amalgamation’.15 The reverberations of war are still felt
in New Zealand’s race relations today. The colonial polity, however, was
not a monolith, but a patchwork of provincial identities loosely gathered
around a distant central authority – a point made emphatically by
Ballantyne when he describes how the nation-state has been ‘deployed
anachronistically’.16 Events that forged some facets of colonial life, such
as the ‘racial crossings’ of intermarriage and intimacy studied by Salesa,
had less significant consequences for provincialism. The survival of the
provincial system was based upon its ability to advance public works
and immigration as part of what James Belich calls the colonial progress
industry, an ‘interacting complex of economic activities … centred on
growth and development’ that formed a ‘motley whole … greater than the
sum of its parts’.17 In New Zealand, as elsewhere, this industry comprised
12
13
14
15
16
17

For more on the significance of localism in New Zealand and how it reflected British
political traditions, see John Cookson, ‘How British? Local government in New Zealand
to c.1930’, New Zealand Journal of History 41, no. 2 (2007): 143–60.
This is examined particularly strongly in Herron, ‘Provincialism and Centralism’. Note,
however, that this binary became pronounced in the 1870s.
André Brett, ‘The Great Kiwi (Dis)Connect: The New Provinces Act of 1858 and its
Consequences’, Melbourne Historical Journal 40 (2012), 129–48.
Damon Salesa, Racial Crossings: Race, Intermarriage, and the Victorian British Empire,
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 181.
Tony Ballantyne, ‘On Place, Space and Mobility in Nineteenth-Century New Zealand’,
New Zealand Journal of History 45, no. 1 (2011): 55.
James Belich, Replenishing the Earth: The Settler Revolution and the Rise of the AngloWorld, 1783–1939 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 185.
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a steady stream of immigrants, the provision of easy credit, the existence
of speculative markets, and the rapid creation of towns, farms, and public
works.
The provinces, as institutions intended to be run by Pākehā for Pākehā,
were not expected to determine Māori relations. Rather, as Pākehā
settlement expanded, the provinces were expected only to administer
to Pākehā wants and needs. Māori were on provincial society’s fringe;
their connections to Pākehā were predominantly negotiated through the
central government, missionaries and personal interaction, rather than by
provincial organs. The Pākehā-centric role of provincial councils aligned
with limitations placed upon the General Assembly in its early years.
Governor Thomas Gore Browne implemented responsible government in
1856, but expressly limited its responsibility to the Pākehā community.
He reserved Māori affairs to himself and perceived them as an imperial
rather than domestic concern. This decision appears to have been made
on his own initiative, as there were no explicit instructions from the
Colonial Office, but once he made the decision London supported it fully.18
The General Assembly, believing that its responsibility should not
be limited, regarded Māori affairs as a domestic rather than imperial
concern. In 1858 Browne granted the Assembly some responsibility
for Māori affairs, explaining that ‘I retain to myself the executive and
administrative part of native affairs, admitting my responsible advisers
to full information, and granting them the right to advise me’, while
reserving the right to pursue different courses of action and to veto
legislation.19 The Colonial Office concurred, unwilling to relinquish
control of Māori affairs to the General Assembly because of ‘the large
expense which every year is incurred for the maintenance of a [British]
military force in New Zealand’.20 The General Assembly was unimpressed.
It proved reluctant to approve money for Māori affairs to be spent by a
governor and staff who were not accountable to the electorate, and a
stalemate developed between governor and parliament.21 Both governor
and General Assembly coveted what powers the imperial government
conceded and were reluctant to share or surrender them. In light of
such events, it is unsurprising that the provinces were never granted
18
19
20
21

Bruce A. Hunter, ‘The Transfer of Responsibility for Native Affairs from the Imperial
Government to the General Assembly of the Colony of New Zealand’ (MA thesis,
University of New Zealand 1949), 43–5.
Thomas Gore Browne to Colonial Secretary Edward Bulwer-Lytton, 14 October 1858,
British Parliamentary Papers: Colonies; New Zealand (BPP).
Colonial Under-secretary Lord Carnarvon to Thomas Gore Browne, 18 May 1859, BPP.
Alan Ward, A Show of Justice: Racial ‘Amalgamation’ in Nineteenth Century New Zealand,
(Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1974), 93.
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control over any aspect of Māori policy. Interactions between Māori and
provincial governments were therefore peripheral to the operation of the
provincial system, and it was little affected by New Zealand’s gradual
acquisition of responsibility for Māori affairs or the expansion of central
government organs for Māori administration.
Still, warfare between settlers and Māori in the central North Island
had notable, albeit indirect, consequences for provincialism. The first
phase of war began in Taranaki on the central western coast. Tensions
between Pākehā and Māori became increasingly fraught throughout
the 1850s in Taranaki because of a range of factors – most notably the
collision of settler hunger for land with increasing Māori reluctance to
sell, the rise of the Māori King movement, and the desire of the British
to impose authority substantively on Māori.22 Open combat commenced
in March 1860, and it soon became apparent that New Zealand had to
bear the burden of considerable military expenditure. Initially, the
central government sought to make Britain pay for the war, arguing New
Zealand itself was incapable of affording it. Parliament – by 1860 home to
a provincialist majority – resisted Edward Stafford’s ministry’s attempts
to pay for the war out of surplus revenues that by law were given to the
provinces.23 But as Britain was unwilling to subsidise a colonial war, the
costs would soon come home to roost one way or another, and when they
did, they had consequences for provincialism.
Taranaki was profoundly affected by war and joined the ranks of pauper
provinces, a category previously only inhabited by weak new provinces.
It was the smallest province by land area and the most vulnerable to
upheaval. In 1858 it was home to 2650 Pākehā outnumbered by 3015
Māori. Its capital New Plymouth, normally home to 937 people, became
encircled and was flooded by almost the entire population of the province
as well as British troops, and hundreds of women and children were
evacuated to Nelson in the South Island.24 By late 1860, this exodus from
the fighting meant the Pākehā civilian population plummeted to 1239
and Māori now outnumbered them three-to-one.25 Tension developed
between troops, civilians and provincial authorities; the territory under
22

23
24
25

Still authoritative is Keith Sinclair, The Origins of the Maori Wars (Wellington: New
Zealand University Press, 1961 [1957]). See also James Belich, The New Zealand Wars
and the Victorian Interpretation of Racial Conflict (Auckland: Auckland University
Press, 1986), 75–80 and Alan Ward, ‘The Origins of the Anglo–Maori Wars: A
Reconsideration’, New Zealand Journal of History 1, no. 2 (1967): 148–70.
Morrell, Provincial System, 118.
Natasha Andrea Elliot-Hogg, ‘The Taranaki Refugees 1860’ (MA thesis, University of
Waikato 1999), 9–17.
Statistics of New Zealand, 1858–60.
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the provincial government’s control essentially shrank to New Plymouth
alone. Taranaki struggled to handle the problems of such close, crowded
living – fire and health hazards, panic when bad news arrived and settler
dissatisfaction with military measures not considered to be sufficiently
decisive.26 Basic provincial functions were suspended for most of 1860,
and the unsettled condition of the province – even after a shaky peace
was established in 1861 – meant that Taranaki could not hope to raise
either sufficient revenue or a loan to cover its costs, compensate settlers
for losses, and resume its role in the progress industry. It was reduced
to surviving on central government support and pleas for loans raised
on colonial security.27 Taranaki’s destitution, however, was a problem
largely confined within its borders – other North Island provinces were
not severely affected. It may have joined Hawke’s Bay and Marlborough
in the ranks of poor provinces and proven that original provinces were
susceptible to failure as well as new provinces, but it was a localised
problem rather than an indictment of the entire system of government.
More significant consequences came when warfare spread into
Auckland Province. War justified central government participation in
immigration, settlement and public works, which had been exclusively
provincial domains since 1853. Initially, this was through construction
of public works required by the military, a job conducted by both colonial
and imperial authorities. The need for military roads in Taranaki and
Auckland ran well ahead of the transport needs of settlers. When George
Grey arrived in Auckland in 1861 to resume the title of governor, he was
acutely aware that although Taranaki was nominally at peace, fighting
could spread quickly to Auckland’s Waikato region. This was of grave
concern, as the approach from the Waikato into southern Auckland was
poorly defended. Grey authorised the construction of a military road,
the Great South Road, ostensibly for defence but with the clear double
purpose of facilitating invasion of the Waikato.28
Despite appearances, this road-building activity does not represent
central expansion at the expense of the provinces. The justification for
the foray into the provincial domain was purely military and could not
have occurred otherwise. In June 1862 the military expressly ordered
that troops were ‘on no account to be employed on roads designed for
26
27
28

Richard S. Hill, Policing the Colonial Frontier: The Theory and Practice of Coercive Social and
Racial Control in New Zealand, 1767–1867 (Wellington: V R Ward, 1986), 518–9.
Appendices to the Journals of the House of Representatives 1861 B-05, 6 (AJHR); AJHR
1862 A-11 and B-01, 5; Elliot-Hogg, ‘The Taranaki Refugees’, 71–3.
J. Rutherford, Sir George Grey KCB, 1812–1898: A Study in Colonial Government (London:
Cassell, 1961), 464.
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the convenience of private individuals, but only on roads … constructed
for the defence of the settlement’. 29 John Larkins Cheese Richardson, a
government minister appointed as commissioner into imperial claims
against the central government, emphasised that although roads like
the Great South Road were ‘of benefit to the Colony, [they] would not
… have been undertaken by it for many years to come’. 30 Attempts by
Wellingtonians to persuade the central government that road con
struction in their province offered military advantages saw no result. 31
As war was not a provincial concern, it made sense for imperial and
colonial funds to be used for constructing military-related works, but
the policy’s influence was limited. It could never have affected public
works in the South Island, or even in areas of the North Island beyond
conflict zones.
On the basis of restoring peace and prosperity after the war, the
central government did however attempt to usurp some provincial
power. This was originally through a proposal of Alfred Domett’s central
ministry and then through the New Zealand Settlements Act. When the
Domett ministry fell in October 1863, it was considering a vast plan for
military roads and settlements throughout the North Island. This plan
was conceived not just to secure a temporary military victory that could
evaporate upon the withdrawal of troops. It sought complete subjugation
of the Māori world to Pākehā by confiscating tracts of land on which a
chain of Pākehā settlements would be established.32 Pākehā population
would thus overwhelm Māori power. The plan appears to derive at least
somewhat from policies Grey implemented as governor of the Cape Colony
in South Africa, modified to suit New Zealand circumstances. However,
his increasing opposition to confiscation in subsequent years indicates
Domett and his ministers were the primary authors.33 Domett’s influence
is certainly apparent: he was profoundly ignorant of Māori culture despite
a 21-year residency in New Zealand. His stern, confrontational approach
was activated by the grossly mistaken belief that the only diplomacy
Māori understood was that ‘might is right’.34
29
30
31
32
33
34

G. S. Whitmore, Assistant Military Secretary, to George Grey’s Private Secretary, 7 June
1852, AJHR 1862 A-06E, 8.
AJHR 1867 B-05A, 6.
Wellington Independent, 21 February 1862, 2.
AJHR 1863, A-08A, 1.
Michael Allen, ‘An Illusory Power? Metropole, Colony and Land Confiscation in New
Zealand, 1863–1865’, in Raupatu: The Confiscation of Māori Land, ed. Richard Boast and
Richard S. Hill (Wellington: Victoria University Press, 2009), 115.
E. A. Horsman, The Diary of Alfred Domett, 1872–1885 (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1953), 30–5.
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Domett’s ministry was replaced by an alliance between Frederick
Whitaker and William Fox, with the former as premier. The Whitaker–
Fox ministry was dominated by the aggressive Māori policy of Auckland
businessmen and land speculators, notably Whitaker himself and
his talented legal partner Thomas Russell. Both had much to gain
by confiscating Māori land.35 On entering office, Whitaker assumed
full responsibility for Māori affairs, placing Grey in easily his weakest
constitutional position in New Zealand.36 But the continued presence of
imperial troops meant Grey had an undefined veto over defence matters,
creating uncertainty over who held ultimate power.37
Three items of legislation characterised Whitaker’s policy and Grey
assented to them despite personal qualms – the Suppression of Rebellion
Act, which suspended habeas corpus, the New Zealand Settlements Act to
confiscate swathes of Māori land, and the New Zealand Loan Act to raise
£3 million to cover the first two acts and the cost of the war. The latter
two acts are significant for provincialism. The Settlements Act was based
on a long British imperial history of military pacification and settlement,
drawing especially on Irish and southern African precedent; it was not
an anomalous act of land-hungry settler politics.38 It was also based on
another history, this one only months long: Domett’s proposals for roadbuilding and settlement, which survived the ministerial transition.
The Settlements Act was an act not simply to confiscate Māori land
throughout the North Island, but also to settle it – under the auspices of
the central government but with provincial involvement. It provided for
the governor-in-council to reserve land for settlement in any district in
which Māori had fought against the Crown, with compensation granted
to Māori who had supported the Crown.39 The Loan Act authorised £3
million to be raised in Britain at a rate of 5 per cent; the government
believed it would meet repayments by selling 1.5 million acres at £2 an
acre.40 Relevant charges for the settlement program were £300,000 for
the introduction of settlers to the North Island and £900,000 for surveys
and public works – and crucially the provinces were to be involved in the
program. This point is often overlooked in arguments that quickly assume
35
36
37
38
39
40

Russell Stone, ‘Russell, Thomas’, Dictionary of New Zealand Biography, accessed 10 June
2013, http://www.teara.govt.nz/en/biographies.
Rutherford, Grey, 496.
Allen, ‘An Illusory Power?’, 120.
Richard Boast, Buying the Land, Selling the Land: Governments and Maori Land in the North
Island, 1865–1921 (Wellington: Victoria University Press, 2008), 50–55.
New Zealand Settlement Act 1863 (27 Victoria, No. 8). See especially clauses 2–5.
Bryan Gilling, ‘Ruapatu: The Punitive Confiscation of Māori Land in the 1860s’, in
Raupatu, ed. Boast and Hill, 17–18.
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the war was, in Ballantyne’s words, the ‘key engine’ for centralisation.
As the provinces administered immigration and public works, the Loan
Appropriation Act delegated the money raised to the provinces in which
the settlement would occur; primarily Auckland, with Taranaki a distant
second. If land revenue were insufficient to repay the interest and sinking
fund to the central government for ‘all sums expended in any Province
for the permanent advantage of such Province’, it would be made a charge
on the province’s general revenue.41 To achieve their objective, the central
government still had to work with the provinces.
The scheme was not successful either as a driver of centralisation or for
its intended purpose of settlement. It did lead to swathes of confiscation
in a legally dubious process that has left a harsh legacy for Māori.42
Confiscating land was one thing; settling it another. At the time the acts
were passed, there was little opposition. Henry Sewell, a rare dissenter,
alleged they were hurried through parliament with poor oversight, no
detailed estimates and insufficient time for members to consider the
proposal.43 The subsequent difficulties substantiate his fears. As previous
authors have indicated at length, it was hard to carry out the scheme when
neither Grey nor the Colonial Office were willing to give full support to
the ministry.44 In short, the Colonial Office urged caution and the inability
of Grey and Whitaker to agree on the details of confiscation delayed the
process. Whitaker wanted to proceed speedily and saw confiscation as
a means of defraying wartime expenses; Grey viewed confiscation as a
form of punishment; in the end the differences were irreconcilable and
the ministry resigned. It was replaced by a ministry led by Frederick
Weld, whose dislike for Grey was decidedly reciprocated, and this did not
bode well for Weld’s policy of New Zealand becoming ‘self-reliant’ and
taking on all costs of war and settlement.45
Worse still were arrangements for immigration. The land was to be
occupied by military settlers and liberal enlistment terms helped attract
recruits, but in haste the government chose quantity over quality.46
Military settlers swept into Auckland and Taranaki before the war was
41
42
43
44
45
46

Loan Appropriation Act, 1863 (27 Victoria No. 12).
Gilling, ‘Raupatu’, 19.
Henry Sewell, The New Zealand Native Rebellion: Letter to Lord Lyttelton (Auckland:
Printed for the author, 1864).
Allen, ‘An Illusory Power?’, 131; Hunter, ‘Transfer of Responsibility for Native Affairs,
170–83’; Morrell, Provincial System, 146; Rutherford, Grey, 498–99 and 509–15.
Rutherford, George Grey, 516–20.
Ross Hamilton, ‘Military Vision and Economic Reality: The Failure of the Military
Settlement Scheme in the Waikato, 1863–1880’ (MA thesis, University of Auckland,
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even over: 5124 arrived in Auckland before the December 1864 census,
comprising over 8 per cent of the province’s population. 47 Many ex
perienced lengthy stays in barracks and were even used as auxiliary
troops rather than settling on confiscated land.48 Once the settlers were
sent on to the land, they received inadequate provisions and complained
of neglect.49 Those granted land near Cambridge and Pirongia soon
requested military protection of their own, prompting howls of derision
from the south.50 Periodic fears war would resume caused many settlers
to retreat to the safety of townships until the scare passed, hobbling their
farms’ performance.
The scheme was visibly crumbling in execution. So too were its finances.
By November 1864 emigration agents were complaining that they had
not received sufficient money. In January 1865 they were forced to
suspend operations.51 Both central and provincial governments struggled
to hold up their end of the bargain. A compromise was reached where
confiscated Waikato land was transferred to Auckland’s control with a
small royalty per acre paid to the central government, but the province
could not maintain the expenses of surveying, constructing public works
and employing settlers. A similar scheme for Taranaki was abandoned,
Auckland could not raise a loan to cover costs except at a ruinous discount,
and in the end land reverted to central management.52 By mid-1867, far
from recouping the loan, land sales had earned just £25,000.53
The whole shambles casts neither central nor provincial government in
a good light. It is hard to sustain Morrell’s conclusion that Auckland was
unable to manage its own colonisation and that provincialism in the North
thereby lost its strongest argument for existence. Much responsibility for
the poorly implemented scheme lay with the central government, and
Auckland inherited it on the brink of collapse. If Morrell’s assertion is to
be accepted, then we must also accept that the central government could
not colonise the North Island and had lost justification for its existence.
The Settlements Act was a bold central vision that successive ministries
attempted to realise with little obvious competence. It was a portent that
central and provincial authorities would find it difficult to work together
on a vast colonising scheme, but it was also an ideological dead end –
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military settlements were never again the cornerstone of development
policy. The centralisation of the 1870s was justified for different, largely
disconnected reasons. As a geographically isolated program, settlement
under the Settlements Act did not allow significant central encroachment
on the provincial domain, especially those provinces outside of the theatre
of war; as a botched program, it did not achieve significant centralisation
in the provinces it affected; as the source of a centralising impulse, it is
not terribly compelling.

War and the timing of centralisation
As wartime policies did not undermine provincial power, where then
should the origins of New Zealand’s centralisation be located? The
problems of provincialism would have required resolution with or
without war, but the central government’s wartime actions help explain
the precise timing of centralisation. This is largely in line with Attard’s
previous research, but his argumentation is confined to economic
considerations that only provide part of the picture. He suggests that
centralisation was necessary to mobilise capital and that war brought
attention to incompatibilities between metropolitan money markets and
New Zealand’s allegedly unsatisfactory institutional structure.54 This
interpretation downplays the initial provincial successes in mobilising
capital, the significance of maladministration and mismanagement, and
that settlers at elections were responding not to international financing
and negotiations, but to their lived experience of which institutions best
met their needs. A consideration of the broader social and political forces
of provincial-era New Zealand reveals that the problems of provincialism
that required resolution were not inherently fatal flaws of institutional
design, but were created by provincial governments themselves.
Electors had high expectations of provincial governments in the 1850s
but the approach of most to public works and finances did not, to put
it mildly, reveal a capacity to meet these expectations. The provinces
experienced significant difficulties with public works, which were under
mined by factors as diverse as labour shortages, petty rivalries and
misplaced priorities.55 There were frequent failures in providing wellmade roads, bridges and harbour works. Problems were most pronounced
in provincial hinterlands, where a profound lack of investment motivated
54
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the campaign culminating in the New Provinces Act of 1858. Between
November 1858 and April 1861, three new provinces – Hawke’s Bay
(ex-Wellington), Marlborough (ex-Nelson) and Southland (ex-Otago) –
secured a divorce from their original province.56
The system having been destabilised through the passage of the New
Provinces Act, the lack of development in the 1850s then provoked an
orgy of loans. Instead of reflecting on how best to mobilise their own
resources or imposing income taxation, the provinces hoped to resolve
their problems quickly by turning to external capital. This option had
been little explored: borrowing was light prior to 1861. Attard highlights
that Stafford’s central ministry of 1856–61 secured an imperial
guarantee for a £500,000 loan and feared the effects of provincial
borrowing. The central loan was secured on the colony’s entire revenue,
including that assigned to the provinces, but a province weighed down by
its own liabilities might have been incapable of contributing its portion
of the loan charges.57 Hence Stafford and Governor Browne both had
an interest in limiting provincial borrowing. But in 1861, the Stafford
ministry fell, largely because of a backlash against its centralist policies.58
Its more provincialist successors, the Fox and Domett ministries, were
sympathetic to provincial loans. Furthermore, the Stafford ministry in
1860 did approve a £300,000 loan for Canterbury to fund an audacious
public works project: a railway tunnel linking Christchurch with its
port Lyttelton.59 This was meant to be an exceptional case with security
derived from the province’s flourishing land sales, but the change in
ministries and the replacement of Browne by Grey saw the arrival of a
governor willing to apply the Canterbury precedent to other provincial
railway proposals.60
Politicians in most provinces began borrowing recklessly for public
works to stimulate development. The central government agreed to
a glittering array of loans for provinces eager to fulfil lofty hopes,
compensate for lost time and exploit their natural resources. Provincial
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loans totalling £2,081,000 were approved in 1862–63, of which the
Domett ministry alone approved £1,871,000. 61 This was not in itself
abnormal. Australasian colonies were particularly active in public works,
as revealed by Davis and Huttenback’s striking data. State expenditure in
Australasia was three times that of the average developed country, and
even other similarly young regions had much lower levels of expenditure. 62
Public works such as railways were placed under state authority in New
Zealand not simply because government had access to cheaper finance
than private borrowers, but because these works served a developmental
purpose, deepened settlement, and facilitated economic growth.63 Rail
ways were prominent in the colonial imagination from the 1850s and
settlers deemed essential the rapid provision of infrastructure. 64 When
the provinces made their first major forays on to the market in the early
1860s, they secured capital. It might not have been inevitable that the
state became heavily involved in public works construction and financing,
but it is unsurprising.
Fatefully for provincialism, one mismanaged railway project brought
an entire province unstuck. Some overly ambitious plans were rejected
by the central government; for example, Fox condemned a foolhardy
Marlborough bid for a railway loan because of inadequate financial
data.65 Unfortunately, however, two Southland railway loans totalling
£250,000 were approved. Southland, seething that secession came just
before Otago grew wealthy from its gold rush, proposed grandiose public
works to divert the gold trade from Dunedin to Southland. In haste, it
built an experimental wooden railway that became a farce. Consequently
Southland did not see a return on its investment and went bankrupt. 66
By mid-1864, its provincial bonds were unsaleable in London and it was
bailed out by the central government, placing considerable burdens on
New Zealand’s finances and creditworthiness. Worse, Southland was just
the leading example of a province that had borrowed much but achieved
61
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little thanks to poor decision-making. Not even large and populous
provinces avoided embarrassment. An 1863 provincial select committee
condemned management of road construction in Otago, especially the
exorbitant costs incurred; a dispute between Wellington’s superintendent
and a hostile council brought public works to a standstill in 1858–61,
ensuring that fertile hinterlands went without cheap transport to
markets; and attempts to bridge the dangerous Waitaki River that
formed the border between Canterbury and Otago were delayed for years
by interprovincial bickering. 67
At the same time as provincial mismanagement stalled New Zealand’s
development, deleterious results for provincialism were created by a
combination of decisions in London and actions taken by the central
government to fund the war. From late 1863 the London Stock Exchange,
mistrustful of obscure colonial borrowers, chose to treat the provinces
as if they were colonial municipalities and declined to quote provincial
bonds. Attard’s research has found the precise reasons for this course
of action unclear, but the failure of the Canadian government to take
responsibility for a recent default by the City of Hamilton was influential
and put the colonies out of favour with investors. 68 Consequently, pro
vincial loans could not be raised except at deep discounts. Worse still,
when the central government floated its £3 million loan to fund the war
and the Settlements Act, it clashed with provincial loans already on the
market. The provinces were furious. The Press in Christchurch argued
that the ‘General Government has killed our credit’.69 Otago failed to
negotiate £650,000 of debentures in London, and Superintendent John
Hyde Harris blamed competition with the £3 million loan as well as
the lack of a guarantee from the central government and a perceived
misapprehension by British investors of the security offered by the
provinces.70 These were common complaints, especially among South
Island provinces eager for money to further development schemes. The
Daily News of Invercargill repeated the charges multiple times before
Southland’s financial collapse became public knowledge.71 Money was
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now hard to obtain, and borrowers who had already proved to be bad
managers were going to find it most difficult.
To compound New Zealand’s financial woes, the central government
encountered problems raising the £3 million loan. The Weld ministry,
overly confident in the loan’s success, spent money with advances from
the Bank of New Zealand while Reader Wood negotiated the loan in
London. Wood requested that Britain guarantee the full loan but was
rebuffed; a guarantee for only £1 million was forthcoming, covering
the portion of the loan for military expenses but not the Settlements
Act scheme.72 Worse followed when the first debentures were placed on
sale. Only £6,100 of £1 million were bought on the first day, increasing
to approximately £30,000 during the next 10 days.73 The loan suffered
from numerous factors, including the general state of the money market,
criticisms of New Zealand during the British parliament’s debate on
guaranteeing the loan, and the shift of the main theatre of war to the
Bay of Plenty. One of the most significant factors was, in the words of the
crown agents, ‘the unfortunate manner in which some of the Provincial
Loans have been dealt with in this market’.74
The provinces emerged the loser from this collision of provincial public
works investment with central war expenditure. The central government
increased the £3 million loan’s interest rate from five to six percent
to make it a more attractive investment, and authority was given for
£1 million of short-dated debentures to be issued at eight percent to
provide a quick injection of funds. The government’s overdraft with
the Bank of New Zealand ballooned to £818,000, causing the bank no
small measure of difficulties.75 However, in fits and starts the loan was
successfully raised, and by 1867 central credit had recovered.76 Provincial
governments, on the other hand, remained in difficulties and their public
works proceeded erratically. This situation required resolution anyway
– not to mobilise capital as in Attard’s interpretation, but to provide
sound administration of essential public works. Settlers grew impatient
and began looking elsewhere for an authority with greater vision and
competence. Charges of provincial governments being imprudent in
their dealings and bereft of foresight in their planning were all too
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justified.77 Rash development generated by inter-provincial rivalry was
no basis for sensible projects, and the central government had already
taken responsibility for building the colony’s telegraph network.78
However, the wartime demand for central borrowing meant prompt
measures were essential for the colony to maintain creditworthiness.
In 1865 Southland and its creditors looked to the General Assembly for
a solution to the province’s ills, with far-reaching consequences. The
central government took on Southland’s debt, with the province’s land
revenue impounded to cover costs. To avoid further disasters, all future
provincial loans required parliamentary approval before they could
receive the governor’s assent.79 This restriction was soon used for two
small Wellington loans, allowing one to be negotiated at a better rate,
but as Morrell notes, this ‘offered such an obvious inducement to logrolling in the Assembly that it might have become dangerous’. 80
The time was ripe for a reorganisation of New Zealand’s finances. The
provinces were servicing loans valued at £2,739,000 at interest of 6–10
percent and had almost nothing to show for them. 81 Only Canterbury,
with its tunnel nearing completion and a small railway network already
operational, could claim any real success. Southland’s railway was
effectively inoperative, the gold rush boom times had moved to the
West Coast, and the province was moribund. In the North, construction
of a railway from Auckland to the Waikato was abandoned amid severe
allegations of financial incompetence, while Wellington’s ambitions
for a railway to the Wairarapa were made ludicrous by the fact that
its roads were poorly formed, public sanitation and drainage were
constant problems, and only hotel lamps provided public lighting. 82 This
crisis of debt was not an inevitable outcome rooted in structural flaws.
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Administrative bungling on the provinces’ behalf had led money to be
frittered away on incomplete and botched projects.
The central government’s solution was to centralise debt and prohibit
provincial borrowing, closing even the parliamentary avenue to loans.
War expenditure was happily declining at the same time as ordinary
revenue was increasing.83 Stafford, who resumed the premiership when
Weld’s ministry fell in October 1865, therefore had a good opportunity
to resolve the poor credit of the provinces by using the improving
credit and security of the colony as a whole. As the central government
was the more powerful and creditworthy borrower, it could negotiate
a consolidation of provincial and central loans on terms favourable to
centralism. The consolidation offered colonial securities in exchange
for provincial, with a loan raised to finance the conversion; provincial
debts became charges by the central government upon the provinces that
incurred them. A province’s share of consolidated revenue would only be
paid after the deduction of annual charges for the consolidated loan.84
Further provincial loans were prohibited, even though Stafford in 1866
had forecast a reconsideration of how provincial loans would be regulated
rather than a ban on them. 85 Powerful provinces such as Canterbury and
Otago were appalled, but the London money market viewed Stafford’s
consolidation favourably.86 The influence of gentlemanly capitalism
gave centralists valuable support in the face of provincialist outrage.
The power of metropolitan credit, however, was not absolute. It did not
effect a transformation of the entire political system – the provinces’
tasks had not been circumscribed and they possessed other revenue
streams through customs, rates, fees, and licences. They were also free to
implement direct taxation but never did so – the political culture of the
time made this option unpopular during the 1860s and New Zealand’s
first direct tax was not introduced until after abolition in 1878. 87
Centralisation of debt solved immediate problems and stopped reckless
provincial borrowing from damaging central creditworthiness, but it
ignored underlying problems with the system. Likewise, by emphasising
borrowing rather than public works, even the most perceptive analyses
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also overlook these problems. The burden of debt was symptomatic of
public works inadequacies, and the difficulties of mobilising capital
only came after mismanagement made the provinces look like a risky
investment at a time of pronounced caution on the market. Worse still
for the provinces, by attempting to sate substantial settler demand
for public works via borrowing rather than other methods, they ran
into competition with central war loans. When the failure of major
public works threw impecunious provinces at the mercy of the central
government, it was easy to revoke provincial power. In essence, trust in
the provinces’ administrative abilities had evaporated.
However, having shaped the timing of the prohibition on provincial
borrowing, the significance of war to centralisation dissipated. Ballantyne
argues that
[w]ar not only enlarged the centralised state but also shifted
political influence away from the provinces. In 1870, Julius
Vogel, the Colonial Treasurer in the new government established
by William Fox in 1869, set before the House an ambitious new
programme of state-driven development.88

This jump from war to the Great Public Works Policy cannot be justified.
As indicated above, problems of public works were entirely of the prov
inces’ making and required resolution anyway. The question was more
fundamental than Attard’s focus on who could raise greater loans or –
as Ballantyne and Dalton would have it – whether war had shifted the
centre of political gravity; it was a question of administrative ability
and vision. The necessity of large-scale public works was apparent, but
the provinces’ sustained inadequacy and incompetence indicated they
might not be the most capable body to fund and oversee such projects.
Vogel emphasised in 1870 that ‘the time has arrived when we must
set ourselves afresh to the task of actively promoting the settlement
of the country’. 89 Accordingly he proposed a national railway network,
major trunk roads, land purchases and immigration, to the tune of £10
million. The key provincial tasks now became central responsibilities.
Metropolitan credit was a component of this policy – included in the
package of legislation that passed parliament was a £4 million loan – but
what attracted electors and made the difference in determining the fate
of provincialism was the vision offered by Vogel. In the words of the
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Otago Daily Times, the Works Policy was a ‘social revolution’ and ‘[t]he
current of our history … [has] entered into a new channel’.90 The debate
between provincialism and centralism was effectively over. As the Daily
Times put it, ‘Provincialism is virtually abolished. Its utter disappearance
is a mere question of time’. Local plans conceived by narrow interests
gave way to a policy of national breadth, attended by a substantial
transfer of authority from provincial to central level. The provinces had
been stripped of their main responsibilities after their administrative
abilities were found wanting and, as a consequence, the justification for
their existence became very flimsy.
Provincialists retaliated vigorously and although they won individual
battles, the cause was lost. Vogel, an astute politician, recognised by
1874 that public opinion had turned decisively against provincialism
and that abolition would provide a truly national basis for his grand
public works vision.91 The 1875–76 election was fought entirely as an
ideological battle: abolition versus provincialism. Electors did not vote
for centralists on the basis of financial data or assumptions about the
power of markets, nor were they motivated by a war that had ended
a few years previously; they made their decision on the basis of their
judgement about which level of government had provided them with
the trappings of modernity. The Works Policy captured the Pākehā
imagination – finally an authority was taking action to satisfy settlers’
needs. The national railway network grew quickly, from 74 kilometres in
1870 to 872 in 1875.92 Over a third of New Zealand’s entire railway net
work was built in the 1870s. The Works Policy’s progress and the central
government’s success were apparent as railway tentacles stretched from
towns in every province into neglected hinterlands. Regional areas
consistently returned abolitionist candidates, as did smaller provinces.
Only Auckland and Otago resisted, and even their support for provincialist
candidates sometimes requires qualification.93 The electorate’s verdict
was clear: provincialism was rejected, and the Abolition Act came into
operation on 1 November 1876.
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Conclusion
The role of war in New Zealand’s centralisation was largely confined
to influencing the timing of debt consolidation. Problems with the
provision of public works and development that prompted electors to
abandon provincialism existed independently of war. This does not mean
warfare was irrelevant to provincialism, but its direct effects were few. It
destabilised Taranaki, creating an extra burden on the system, and the
Settlements Act was a harbinger that central and provincial governments
would struggle to work together. However, the poor execution of the
Settlements Act reflected badly on both tiers of government and the
measure did not achieve any substantial transfer of power. Other central
attempts to usurp provincial authority, such as the construction of
public works for primarily military purposes, were of little significance
or limited applicability. Warfare’s greatest contribution to centralisation
was through the collision of provincial and central loans in London,
which deepened the provinces’ borrowing woes and heightened the
need for a resolution. Nonetheless, this was just one step on the road
to abolition: the refashioning of New Zealand’s political institutions
was not an inevitable result of any structural incompatibility with
metropolitan credit markets but primarily a response to provincial
maladministration.
Leaping from warfare to the Works Policy is unwarranted, as public
works failures provide a direct path to Vogel’s momentous proposals.
Mismanagement of and reckless borrowing for provincial public works
achieved little, and when the provinces were stripped of borrowing powers
in 1867 the door to centralisation was already open wide as provinciallyadministered infrastructural development stagnated. Vogel did have an
eye on pacifying the central North Island through public works and the
spread of Pākehā civilisation, an objective he increasingly emphasised
later in life.94 However, his primary emphasis in 1870 was stimulating
the work of colonisation that the provinces had botched, and this emph
asis captivated New Zealand. It is unnecessary to assume the forces of
gentlemanly capitalism were the primary mover; local events were more
than sufficient to convince electors that the provinces had outlived their
usefulness. The provinces were doomed by their own failures, not by war
or markets, and became ensnared by the compression of time and space
created through a successful central program of development.
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